We describe a practical implementation of the modular eballot system proposed in ref. [1] .
Introduction
Implementing a balloting system requires making many choices when the theoretical steps of the protocol must be realized by software procedures. Simple statements can become quite complex to implement and many subtle points arise which could reduce or make useless the entire protocol.
For this reason, we consider to be a very important issue to implement in a working system the protocol proposed in ref. [1] . We will see as some a-priori simple steps are quite problematic to implement and we discuss our solutions and possible improvements.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the approach taken in building the system, in section 3 the hardware and software choices, in section 4 the procedure to setup the ballot, in section 5 the setup of the operating system and in section 6 the setup of the application.
Approach
To implement the modular eballot protocol we can choose basically one of the following approaches:
1. design, develop and implement custom hardware and software 2. design, develop and implement custom software based on commercially available hardware 3. use common hardware and software and design, develop and implement only the specific software applications needed to implement the protocol.
If we consider these three approaches purely theoretically, they are obviously ordered in decreasing level of security. Indeed a custom hardware/software solution can in principle offer the maximum possible security.
But in practice the effort required by approaches 1 and 2 is often too large. Besides the need for a large team of developers and long developing times, the probability that at least for the first few releases/models there will be many vulnerabilities, is very high.
In our setup with limited resources and short developing times, we have adopted the third approach, choosing common hardware and well proved software to implement the eballot protocol. We have selected well known and well supported software, which have known history of vulnerabilities and fast releases of patches.
We have then chosen software that we can trust in the sense that they have a very large number of users and large support, trading the low number of vulnerabilities and external support for the absence of features which could be helpful in implementing the protocol and the presence of features not needed for it.
The hardware/software choices
For the first release of the implementation we have chosen the simplest possibility:
• the voter uses her own web browser
• the AuthSrv and the VoteSrv are implemented as web applications running on common web servers
• the Anonymizer is a simple NAT device.
With this setup it is not possible to implement the blind signature version of the protocol presented in ref. [2] and discussed in Appendix A of ref. [1] . We will not consider blind signatures for our implementation nor in the rest of this paper.
An improvement on the current implementation would be to realize the client proxy. This will allow to add more features for the voter, like a more controlled access to the system, automatic check of the digital certificate of the web sites, removal at the origin of all personal information from the http transaction, like the UserAgent field. Notice that the realization of a client proxy will require:
• to support versions of the client proxy for all computing platforms that the voters could use
• the possibility of vulnerabilities in the client proxy and the necessity to implement a system to manage its patches, distribution of new releases etc.
For what concerns the Anonymizer, a simple approach to improve over the simple NAT device is to make the voters access the web servers through the tor network [3] .
In any case, the voter (or the client proxy for her) must check the fingerprints of the digital certificates of the AuthSrv and VoteSrv to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks.
For what concerns the Operating System, the choice has been dictated mostly by our experience and personal competence and has been a Linux distribution. The system can be implemented almost identically on any *BSD distribution or Unix-like OS. What in particular lead us to the choice of Linux has been the RSBAC kernel patch [4] which provides Mandatory Access Control (MAC) features very useful for the security of the servers and for implementing some aspects of the protocol.
As for the web server application, it has obviously been chosen Apache [5] with PHP [6] . For added simplicity, no SQL server is used but all data is stored in flat files. For SSL/TLS openssl [7] is used whereas for the cryptographic operations of the protocol the gnupg [8] implementation of OpenPGP [9] with the gpgme and gpg-agent extensions, has been adopted.
Clocks of the servers are synchronized using ntp [10] but the ntpd daemon is not running during a ballot.
During a ballot the only open ports on the servers are tcp 80/443 (and, only if needed, icmp echo-request). The only possible way of login on the servers is at the console.
The core of the implementation is given by PHP-5 scripts which can be downloaded under a GPLv2 license. The PHP scripts require the php-gpgme extension to interact with gnupg. Some crucial routines have been written in C.
In the rest of this paper we will describe our example implementation of the protocol, even if the system can be installed on different OS and web-servers following a similar procedure, or implemented in similar way.
Ballot setup and procedures
To implement the protocol, besides the voter, 5 human roles, ballot officials and machine administrators, are needed: Each manager creates her own OpenPGP private/public key and gives to the other managers the public key.
Every cryptographic operations must be done with reasonably secure algorithms, so for example symmetric algorithms, like AES, should have at least 128-bit keys, asymmetric algorithms, like RSA, at least 1024-bit keys and cryptographic digest (or hashes) more than 130-bit hash, so at the moment of writing for example SHA1 can be used but not MD5.
The AuthMgr, optionally in collaboration with the AuthSysMgr, creates the vote credentials for all voters:
• username + password and/or client digital certificate (these can be reused for more ballots)
• a PseudoRandom (PR) string called VoteToken, 1 unique for each voter and each ballot and that can be used only once.
(As a technical detail, the username have been chosen in the charset [a-zA-Z0-9 .@-] and the VoteToken in the charset [a-zA-Z0-9 .] .)
The AuthSysMgr and the VoteSysMgr create the digital certificates for their https web servers and give the fingerprints of the certificate to the AuthMgr.
The AuthMgr distributes to all voters the ballot credentials and the fingerprints. It is suggested that the username+password and VoteToken are distributed using different communication channels.
The AuthSysMgr installs in the gnupg keyring of the AuthSrv her own private and public OpenPGP key and the public keys of the AuthMgr and VoteSysMgr. The VoteSysMgr does the same on her server with her own private and public OpenPGP key and the public keys of the AuthMgr, AuthSysMgr and VoteMgr.
The AnonSysMgr must configure the Anonymizer so to redirect all packets to the VoteSrv and not log any connection.
After the applications have been configured (see the next sections) the server will be sealed by the AuthMgr and VoteMgr respectively and no login or modification of the software can be done. All accesses or modification must be logged and reported so that the respective manager can check the integrity of the machine during all the period of the ballot. After the sealing of the servers, the systems start accepting connections from the voters.
After a voter has successfully authenticated, the AuthSrv checks that the VoteToken has not been used already and generates a unique PR string called VoteAuthorization (the VoteAuthorization has been chosen in the charset [a-zA-Z0-9 .]). The AuthSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the AuthMgr public key the used VoteToken together with the username of the voter and the current timestamp, and saves it on the disk in a file having as name the VoteToken to mark it as used. The AuthSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the VoteSysMgr public key the VoteAuthorization (and the optional PIN, see [1] ) and sends it to the voter (optionally with the PIN in clear). The AuthSrv also digitally signs and encrypts with the AuthMgr public key the VoteAuthorization (but not the optional PIN) and saves it on the disk in a file having as name the VoteAuthorization.
The voter then connects to the VoteSrv through the Anonymizer, receives the web Form with the ballot, and sends to the server her ballot and the VoteAuthorization. The VoteSrv verifies that the VoteAuthorization decrypts correctly, has the correct signature of the AuthSysMgr, and has not been used before. If there is a PIN, it checks that the PIN submitted in the Form is the same as the one included in the decrypted VoteAuthorization. The VoteSrv digitally signs and encrypts with the AuthMgr public key the VoteAuthorization and saves it on the disk in a file having as name the VoteAuthorization to mark it as used. It then computes a digest of the vote with the current timestamp and a random string and calls it VerificationCode, digitally signs and encrypts with the VoteMgr public key the vote together with the VerificationCode and saves it on the disk in a file having as name the VerificationCode (the VerificationCode is a hexadecimal string). Finally it computes the digital signature of the VerificationCode and sends to the voter the VerificationCode, its digital signature, the timestamp and the random string.
The voter can recompute the VerificationCode using her vote, the timestamp and the random string, and the VoteMgr can check that the VerificationCode is authentic by verifying the digital signature of the VerificationCode done by the VoteSrv.
At the end of the ballot period, the AuthMgr checks the AuthSrv and removes the seal. Then the AuthSysMgr prepares one CD with the list of used VoteTokens and created VoteAuthorizations and gives it to the AuthMgr. The VoteMgr checks the VoteSrv and removes the seal. The VoteSysMgr prepares two CDs, one with the used VoteAuthorizations and gives it to the AuthMgr, the other with the votes and gives it to the VoteMgr.
The AuthMgr decrypts and checks the signatures of her two CDs. She verifies that the information is consistent and that the number of votes is consistent with the number of used VoteTokens and VoteAuthorizations. The AuthMgr publishes the list of used VoteTokens with the associated username and timestamp and the list of unused VoteTokens.
The VoteMgr does not decrypts the votes but publishes the list of VerificationCodes (remember that each vote is in a file having as name the VerificationCode).
The voters have now time to check that the information published are correct: if they have voted or not, the time of their authentication and the existence of their VerificationCode. If there is a problem they must report it to the AuthMgr or VoteMgr.
After this check is done, the VoteMgr decrypts the votes, checks the signatures and count them. The VoteMgr then publishes the list of each vote with the associated VerificationCode and the final results of the ballot. Each voter can check that her vote is correctly listed and that the final count is correct.
We now assume that the systems are setup correctly and that the procedures are followed as described.
Operating system setup and security
As already mentioned, the two servers must be configured so that they can be sealed before the beginning of the ballot and the managers can check that no modification to the software nor login to the system are done during the ballot itself. We will describe below how we have chosen to seal the systems. For what concerns the verification of the integrity two things must be done:
• verify that programs are not modified
• verify that logs are not tampered with.
For the integrity of the programs and of the log files various approaches can be adopted. For example a forensic image of the disk can be made before the sealing of the machine and a verification of the modifications after the end of the ballot. It is simpler, but we believe still appropriate for our purposes, to use a program like tripwire [11] or aide [12] to record the digest and properties of all files on the disk and check that they have not been modified at the end of the ballot.
Besides the normal hardening of the operating system, we have included some extra features which should increase notably the level of security of the systems.
As mentioned, for our implementation we have adopted the RSBAC patch to the Linux kernel which introduces Mandatory Access Control features. The RSBACpatched Linux kernel, for our purposes, can be said to be in one of the following three states: rsbac softmode MAC rules are not enforced but violations are logged rsbac enforcing MAC rules are enforced at the kernel level but the security officer (uid=400) can modify the MAC rules (the root user, uid=0, cannot modify the MAC rules, nor any other user) rsbac frozen MAC rules are enforced at the kernel level and nobody can modify any MAC rule: to switch to one of the previous states a reboot is needed with a special kernel parameter (this is the default state).
The rsbac frozen mode corresponds to the sealed status of the servers. The MAC rules adopted mark most of the disk as read-only and execute, mark the log files as append-only, disable the loading of kernel modules after boot, disable the mounting of partitions on directories etc. In particular, all executable and configuration files both of the OS and of the eballot application (e.g. the PHP scripts) are marked as read-only and executable so that they cannot be modified while running in enforcing or frozen mode by any user or program.
But the specific purpose of RSBAC is to solve a particular problem of our implementation. As we have seen both the AuthSrv and the VoteSrv record information in flat files:
• the AuthSrv writes on disk the used VoteTokens
• the AuthSrv writes on disk the created VoteAuthorizations
• the VoteSrv writes on disk the used VoteAuthorizations
• the VoteSrv writes on disk the votes.
Each one of these is written to its own file with its own distinguished name. We should guarantee that
• the file is written only if it does not exist
• the file cannot be modified or deleted after creation.
In practice we need write-once read-many files. The first possible solution to this problem is to use special write-once read-many devices. Besides the cost of these devices, there is a problem: the order of the files in the device is exactly the order in which they are written, thus by matching this order is possible to match voter, e.g. VoteToken, to VoteAuthorization to Vote (obviously if one has read access to all devices). To prevent this, we need to add another requirement on the file creation:
• the order in the directory and timestamp of the files should not be meaningful.
A second solution is to adopt normal disks and to use RSBAC to mimic as much as possible the behavior of a write-once read-many filesystem. What we can do is to mark as append-only the directories and all included files where our files will be written. Moreover the partitions where these files reside must be mounted with hard-locking enabled. Thus when we write one of these files we open-append it acquiring a hard lock only if the file does not exist, and before starting writing we check that the file is empty. Doing in this way, the files can be always appended later, so it is not a true write-once, but the initial contents of the files cannot be modified. We then change the access time and modified time of all files in the directory to a fixed timestamp, so that all files appear as having been created and modified at the same time (this is again possible using the detailed permissions on capabilities of RSBAC).
Still we haven't completely solved the problem of the ordering of the files in the directories since both the order of the filenames in the directory file and the inode numbers leak information about the order of creation of the files. In our tests the leaked information appears to be little and difficult to use so that at best we have been able to reconstruct only a partial order of the files which has not allowed us to precisely match files in different directories.
Application setup and security
The PHP applications require some configuration. The choices give different level of security and different features. As always, more user-friendly features often correspond to lower security levels.
To configure the AuthSrv we need to add the public and private OpenPGP keys already described. The private key of the AuthSysMgr is encrypted with a passphrase. The application allows either to write the passphrase to a file which is read every time it is needed, or it is loaded by the system manager at boot by hand in a opportunely configured gpg-agent. The second choice is in principle more secure, since the passphrase is not written in a file readable by the apache user, but adds an extra failure point. Indeed if the gpg-agent crashes or stops working, the full application cannot work either. The same considerations apply to the VoteSrv.
It is possible to choose if each username must correspond to a single VoteToken, or if username and VoteToken are checked independently. In this second case more voters can use the same username, but still each voter can use her own VoteToken only once.
It is possible to choose the length of the random string generated by the application giving the possibility to balance the trade-off between time to generate and space to memorize, likelihood of collisions and so on.
Having two independent servers running, a possible problem arises if the second server is unreachable, not working or if the voter wants to connect to it at a later moment. Since the VoteToken can be used only once, how can the voter save her VoteAuthorization for later use?
In the application there are two possibilities on top of the more secure but less friendly of not allowing the voter to save her VoteAuthorization. (Actually the VoteAuthorization is stored as a hidden field in the web Form sent to the voter's browser. By reading the source of the page the voter can save her VoteAuthorization. Moreover notice that if a client proxy is used, this problem does not arise since the client proxy can store securely the VoteAuthorization for the voter.)
The first solution is to offer the possibility to the voter to print (or save on disk) her VoteAuthorization. Later on the voter can connect directly to the VoteSrv (through the Anonymizer) and type/past in a web Form the VoteAuthorization.
The second possibility is to store the VoteAuthorization on the AuthSrv as a file with a name containing the voter's VoteToken. If the voter authenticates again to the AuthSrv with her own already used VoteToken, no new VoteAuthorization is created but the old VoteAuthorization is given to the voter. At the end of the ballot period all stored temporary VoteAuthorizations are deleted since they could leak some information between the voter (the VoteToken in the filename) and the VoteAuthorization (even if these last are encrypted with the VoteSysMgr public key).
In both cases, as an added security for the voter, a PIN can be generated and added to the VoteAuthorization before encryption. This PIN is not stored anywhere else and is only sent to the voter when the VoteAuthorization is first created. When the voter later connects to the VoteSrv, she will be asked the PIN in the ballot web Form. Thus even if someone intercepts or steals the stored VoteAuthorization and tries to cast a ballot with it, without the PIN is useless.
The configuration of the VoteSrv is similar to the one of the AuthSrv.
